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ABSTRACT 
  We develop a conceptual framework for quantifying fixed transactions costs facing semisubsistence 
households.   Using household survey data from a sample of 324 Kenyan maize farmers, we generate 
estimates of household supply and demand schedules, as well as the price bands that they face.  Our 
econometric results indicate that on average the ad valorem tax equivalent of the fixed transactions costs 
facing the households in our sample is 28%.  Additional analysis indicates that both remoteness and 
infrastructure quality have significant impacts on the size of the transactions costs facing farm 





  The development and dissemination of improved agricultural technologies has long been 
identified by agricultural scientists, international donors and other students of economic 
development as an important vehicle for reducing poverty in developing countries.  The majority 
of poor people in LDCs historically have been, and continue to be, located in rural areas (Naylor 
and Falcon, 1995).  Agriculture is generally the primary source of income for the rural poor, both 
through crop production activities and via employment in agriculture and agriculture-related 
industries (Reardon,et al., 1998; Renkow, 1999; Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown, 1989).   
  There is by now little remaining doubt that the widespread adoption of improved seeds, 
fertilizers, and other agricultural technologies since the outset of the Green Revolution has had a 
profound positive impact on aggregate incomes, including the incomes of the poor (Byerlee, 
1996).  Considerable concern remains, however, about the spatial distribution of the benefits of 
new agricultural technologies.  For those locations where external conditions limit a household’s 
ability to market agricultural products or increase agricultural productivity, alternative public 
investments may well hold greater potential for poverty alleviation than additional agricultural 
research.    4 
  This view is supported by recent work by Fan and Hazell (1999) indicating significant 
impacts on poverty reduction of public infrastructure investments in India.  Such investments can 
work in a number of ways to enhance the returns to resources commanded by rural households.  
By lowering the transactions costs of market exchange, they can boost net returns to agricultural 
production.  They can lead to greater availability (at lower cost) of necessary agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizers and chemicals, and thus improve welfare by increasing agricultural 
productivity.  Perhaps more importantly, improved transportation and communications 
infrastructure facilitates spatial integration of product and factor markets –both in the agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors.   
  In this paper we develop a conceptual framework for quantifying fixed transactions costs 
facing semisubsistence households.   Using household survey data from a sample of 324 Kenyan 
maize farmers, we generate estimates of household supply and demand schedules, as well as the 
price bands that they face.  Our econometric results indicate that on average the ad valorem tax 
equivalent of the fixed transactions costs facing the households in our sample is 28%.  Additional 
analysis indicates that both remoteness and infrastructure quality have significant impacts on the 
size of the transactions costs facing farm households.  To the best of our knowledge, ours are the 
first empirical estimates of the magnitude of transactions costs. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops a conceptual framework for 
analyzing the size and statistical significance of fixed transactions costs in semisubsistence 
agriculture.  We then outline an empirical strategy for estimation.  Following a discussion of 
econometric issues and data, we present our results.  Some concluding remarks are found in the 
paper’s final section. 
  5 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
  We are interested in measuring the size and statistical significance of transactions costs 
facing semisubsistence households that both produce and consume a staple commodity such as 
wheat or rice.  Our starting point is the agricultural household model with missing markets 
analyzed by de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet (1991).  Recently, Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 
(2000) have extended that model to consider both proportional and fixed transactions costs.  
  In our model we explicitly consider only fixed transactions costs.
1  Standard examples of 
fixed transactions costs include costs associated with search, social barriers, and imperfections in 
other markets in which the household participates.  Examples of these latter effects include 
information asymmetries and other barriers to entry into land markets (Shaban, 1987), thin 
agricultural labor markets in which quality differences exist between household and family labor 
(B Be en nj ja am mi in n, ,   1 19 99 92 2) ), ,   a an nd d   c cr re ed di it t   a an nd d   i in ns su ur ra an nc ce e   m ma ar rk ke et t   f fa ai il lu ur re es s   d du ue e   t to o   c co ov va ar ri ia at te e   p pr ro od du uc ct ti io on n   r ri is sk ks s   
( (T To ow wn ns se en nd d, ,   1 19 99 93 3; ;   U Ud dr ry y, ,   1 19 99 94 4) ). . 
  To provide a theoretical framework for our empirical approach, we first specify the 
household's indirect utility function as 
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where Pi is the household price of maize, ￿(Pi , z2i ) is the household's profit from maize 
production, wi is the household's wage rate, Ti is the households time endowment, ￿i is 
exogenous income, and z1i
 and z2i are demand and supply shift variables.   
                                                 
1 Households in our sample report the price at which they bought and sold maize.  We interpret these prices as 
inclusive of any proportional transactions costs incurred by the maize traders; i.e., we take them to be the incentive 
prices for the households that participate in the market.  However, there are also a number of autarkic households in 
our sample, some who report identical buying and selling prices, and some who even report a higher selling price 
than buying price.  This suggests to us that there are fixed transactions cost associated with market participation.  6 
  In (1) all prices are household specific.  For households that participate in the maize market, 
the relevant decision price is the market price.  For households that do not participate in the 
market  Pi is endogenous.  We obtain the household's shadow price in autarky by solving for the 
root of the total derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price, 
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Equation (2) is a well known result in the literature on international trade, and simply says that 
utility will be minimized at the autarky price, Pi
A (Woodland).  This, of course, is another way of 
saying there will be gains to trade provided the free trade price is not equal to the autarky price.  
A somewhat more intuitive view of equation (2) is obtained by dividing through by the marginal 
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Applying Roy's Identity and Shepard's lemma to (2'), we can see that the shadow price for the 
autarkic household is the price that equates household supply to demand.   
  With fixed transactions costs, the household will be just indifferent between autarky and 
participating in the market when 
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The superscripts A and M on price denote the household's autarky and market prices, 
respectively, and FTCi is the income equivalent of the fixed transactions costs that household i 
incurs to buy or sell in the market.    7 
  For a household with positive marketed surplus, utility is increasing in price  so (3) implies 
that the market price must be above the autarky price before the household will participate in the 
market.  Likewise, utility is decreasing in price for  households with a negative marketed surplus 
so (3) implies that such households will not participate in the market unless the market price is 
below the autarky price.   
 Let  ￿i  be the tax equivalent of the FTC.  Using the household's indirect utility function, ￿i 
is implicitly defined for net sellers as  
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and for net purchasers as  
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  The participation decision (but not the marginal analysis underlying how much to supply or 
consume) is made by comparing utility evaluated at the autarky price to utility evaluated at the 
purchase/selling price plus the tax equivalent of the fixed transactions costs.  For example, a 
household will be a net seller when 
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Since utility is increasing (decreasing) in prices for net sellers (buyers), the participation 




iii PPτ <−  ⇒   marketed surplus > 0 
 
AM
iii PPτ >+  ⇒   marketed surplus < 0  (6)  8 
 
MA M
ii iii PP P ττ −< < +   ⇒   marketed surplus = 0. 
  In our empirical work, we measure the size and statistical significance of ￿i.  We interpret 
our results as measuring the size of a hypothetical tax the household must collect to pay for the 
costs of market entry.  However, the tax is never actually collected by a government entity, and 




  We exploit the theoretical constraints in our structural model to estimate the size of ￿i .  As 
a by-product we also obtain consistent estimates of the supply and demand parameters, which are 
of considerable interest in their own right.   From (6) we know that households will select into 
one of three regimes depending on the relationship between their shadow price in autarky and 
their purchase/selling price plus the tax equivalent of the fixed transaction costs.  To derive the 
household's autarkic shadow price, we first specify the household's demand and supply functions 
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As denoted above, z1ik and z2ik are demand and supply shift variables and Pi is the household's 
decision price.  In our empirical specification, all variables are in logs, so the elasticities of 
demand and supply are ￿2 and ￿2 respectively.  Village fixed effects are included in both the 
supply ( fv) and income (gv) equations.  The fixed effects in the supply equation control for  9 
unobserved differences among villages in agro-climatic conditions and the overall state of 
farming technology.  In the income equation, the fixed effects control for unobservable 
differences affecting farm income as well as variation in village level wage rates and 
opportunities for off-farm employment.  Finally, the zik are observable variables that will affect 
household income.  These variables include, but are not limited to, all of the exogenous variables 
in the demand and supply equations.   















iv i i k ki
k
qg P z e









  (7′′′ ′ ) 
 
where the * superscripts indicate the parameters are now linear combinations of the original 
demand parameters and the income parameters.  All parameters of the supply equation remain 
identified, however, the demand parameters contain the income effects.  This is not a 
shortcoming if the principle interest is in measuring the size of transactions costs, or in the 
elasticities of marketed surplus.    
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Substituting the shadow price into the participation constraint, and rearranging yields 
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  The final step in our structural model is to specify the nature of ￿i.  Our first specification, 
and the simplest, is  
     3 ii e ττ =+ ,  (10) 
where e3i is the unobservable component of transactions costs and has mean zero and variance 
2
3 σ .  This specification assumes that all households face identical transactions costs on average. 
Substituting this equation into the participation constraints, and moving e3i  over to the left hand 
side of the first two inequalities, and into the middle of the third, completes our initial structural 
model.   
  Our second specification allows transactions costs to vary by time of transport available and 
proximity to market: 
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where T1 is an indicator variable equal to one if the primary mode of transportation within a 
village is by truck, T2 is an indicator variable equal to one if the primary mode of transportation 
within a village is by bike or animal, and D is the distance from the village to the nearest   11 
permanent market.    Here, the interactive terms are included to test whether the effect of 
distance differs depending on the dominant mode of transportation available to the household. 
  An examination of the switching conditions quickly shows why standard regression analysis 
leads to biased estimates.  Conditional on being a net seller or buyer, transactions costs truncate 
the distribution for the error terms in the demand and supply equations.  A standard fix to obtain 
consistent estimates for the demand and supply parameters is Heckman's two stage procedure 
where the probability of a household being a net buyer, seller, or in autarky is first estimated, and 
the selectivity terms are then included in a second stage regression to obtain estimates of the 
remaining structural parameters (Goetz).  
  This  procedure yields consistent estimates of the demand and supply parameters, but 
without further restrictions will not identify the factors affecting transactions costs separately 
from the factors determining supply and demand.  One possible restriction is to assume that the 
variables influencing transactions costs are separate from the variables affecting a household's 
production and consumption decision.  However, we anticipate a households transactions costs to 
depend partly on its wealth, education, and demographics, the very set of variables that should be 
included in an analysis of household production or consumption.  Since ￿i  enters linearly in the 
switching condition a Probit analysis cannot separately identify the effect of variables entering 
into both ￿i and the demand and supply equations.   
 To  identify  ￿i we jointly estimate it along with the demand and supply equations.  
Intuitively, the demand and supply parameters are identified using the observed responses of 
households that do participate in the market, and the switching conditions are used to identify 
transactions cost parameters.  In order for this approach to work,  we must assume that household 
demand and marginal cost schedules are identical for autarkic and non-autarkic households alike.   12 
This is a big assumption, but perhaps not more objectionable than assuming constant elasticities 
across villages.     
  
The Likelihood Function  
 Let  n(e1,e2,e3) be the multivariate density function for the demand, supply, and transaction 
cost error terms.  We assume the error terms are normally distributed, and allow for correlation 
between e1 and e2.  The unobservable component of transactions costs, e3,  is assumed to be 
independently distributed from the other errors.
2 
  To obtain the contribution to the likelihood function for a household with positive marketed 
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Note that u3 is the term on the left hand side of the first two participation conditions in (9), and 
the middle term in the last condition, after (10) or (11) is substituted in for ￿i. 
  Integrating over the area of positive marketed surplus, the contribution to the likelihood 
function from a selling household is 
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Λ= + − −  −  ∑∑ , and E[￿i]  is the expected 
value of transactions costs. 
 
                                                 
2 At this point, this is an assumption made solely for simplicity, and will be relaxed in further work.  13 
  For net purchasing households, the transformation is the same as (12) with the exception 
that the sign on e3 is switched.  Let JP be the Jacobian for this transformation.  The contribution 
to the likelihood function from a purchasing household is 
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3 3 () U nu be the marginal distribution for u3.  The contribution to the likelihood 
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The total likelihood function can be compactly written by defining di(r) to be an indicator 
function equal to 1 if household i is in regime r, r ￿ {Selling, Purchasing, Autarky}.  For an 









) ( ,    which we 
maximized using the BFGS algorithm with numerical derivatives. 
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where ￿ is the Hessian of the log-likelihood function, and ￿ is the outer-product matrix, both 
 




  14 
DATA 
  To test our model, we used data collected as part of the Kenya Maize Impact Study (KMIS).  
The study collected household level information from a sample of 426 farmers located in six 
maize agro-climatic zones in Kenya, as well as village level information for the 30 villages in 
which respondents dwelled (Karanja, forthcoming). The household and village surveys were 
conducted concurrently between June and October 1999.
3 
  Table 1 provides the summary statistics.  Of the 426 original observations, 69 households 
had missing data on maize production or consumption and were dropped from the analysis.  33 
households reported both purchasing and selling maize, and were also dropped leaving 324 
observations.   Out of the 324 remaining households 127 households had a positive marketed 
surplus, 113 had a negative marketed surplus, and 84 remained in autarky.  Typically, 
households of each type coexist in the same village.  However, all households in four villages 
had a positive marketed surplus.  Three of these villages are located in the Western highlands, a 
region of large commercial farms.   
  Regardless of their market position, each household reported a selling and purchase price for 
maize.  In our econometric analysis we used the selling price in both the demand and supply 
equations for households with a positive marketed surplus, the purchase price for households 
with a negative marketed surplus, and the average of reported buying and selling price for the 
autarkic households.  Since the autarkic households were not involved in any market 
transactions, it is not clear whether the price they reported is that observed in the local village 
markets, or the price they would receive inclusive of any marketing costs.  Finally, for all non-
                                                 
3 The sampling frame of the KMIS was a subset of a much larger household survey conducted as part of the 1994 
Kenya Maize Data Base project.  That project used GIS techniques to design a spatial sampling frame for a national 
survey of 1300 Kenyan maize farmers (see Hassan, Lynam, and Okoth, 1998 for details).  For the KMIS, the  15 
autarkic households, prices varied over villages, and over households within the same village, 
indicating that the incentive price is truly household specific.  
  Besides the village fixed effects and maize prices, an education dummy, farm size, and 
household size are included in the both the demand and supply equations.  The education dummy 
is one if the head of household has a secondary education or higher.  In the supply equation, it is 
included as a measure of human capital that may increase maize productivity.  Education is 
included the demand equation as a possible determinant of total household income, presumably 
originating from higher on-farm labor productivity or higher wages in off-farm employment.  
Farm size is a measure of household wealth on the demand side, and an input into maize 
production on the supply side.  Household size measures aggregate household demand for maize.  
We have made no adjustments at this stage for household composition.  In the supply equation, 




  Table 2 provides the maximum likelihood estimates for our first model.  Both equations are 
estimated with a full set of village fixed effects, which are not reported in order to save space.  
The price elasticities are reasonable in magnitude and precisely estimated.  Both farm size and 
household size have a positive, and statistically significant, impact on maize consumption.  
Having an education level at the secondary level or better also increases maize consumption 
although the coefficient is not significantly different than zero.  An increase in farm size 
increases maize supply; however, neither household size or education having a significant effect.  
                                                                                                                                                             
proportional distribution of the farmers between different zones was determined by the relative importance of maize 
in each zone, logistical considerations and available research funds. 
4 Agricultural labor markets are typically quite thin in Kenya, hence family labor availability is an important 
determinant of maize production (Karanja, forthcoming).  16 
  Before turning to the transactions costs estimates, it is informative to compare the results in 
Table 2 to the results from a standard SUR model that ignores the selectivity in the sample.  
Table 3 provides the SUR results, once again not reporting the fixed effects.  The greatest 
difference is in the price elasticities.  Without accounting for transactions costs, both are biased 
towards zero and insignificant.  This result corresponds to the finding in Key, Sadoulet, and de 
Janvry who find the price elasticity of marketed surplus becomes smaller in absolute value and 
statistically insignificant when transactions costs are not taken into account.   
  One reason why our structural model including transaction costs results in a higher degree 
of price responsiveness than the SUR model is that the price elasticities are estimated using those 
households who are actually responding to market prices (while properly accounting for the 
effect of the selectivity on the error distribution).  A second reason is that the price elasticities 
affect  the probability of a household being in autarky.  The participation equations in (9) show 
that the probability of being a net purchaser or seller depends on the difference between the 
demand and supply price elasticities.  Intuitively, the response of a households autarkic shadow 
price to exogenous shocks increases as demand and supply become more price inelastic.  All else 
the same, this will decrease the probability of a household remaining in autarky.  For reasonable 
estimates of transactions costs, then, extremely inelastic demand and supply elasticities are 
incompatible with a sample such as ours where 26% of the households surveyed do not buy or 
sell maize.     
  The primary benefit in estimating the transactions costs jointly with the remaining structural 
parameters is we can measure their size relative to market price.  This is not possible with the 
two-stage Heckman procedure, and does not appear to be possible using the approach of Key, 
Sadoulet, and de Janvry, who work with a somewhat different selectivity equation.  Table 2  17 
reports our estimate of τ  to be .25 with a standard error of .03.  This estimate is measured 
relative to the logarithm of prices, so the ad valorem tax equivalent of the fixed transactions costs 
is equal to the exponent of .25, or 1.28.  On average, then, transactions costs cause a price band 
equal to 28% of the market price.   The mean selling and purchase price for maize are 11.45 and  
15.21 Ksh/kg, respectively, so in levels transactions costs vary from 3.21 Ksh to  4.26 Ksh.   To 
us, this seems like a reasonable number.  Transactions costs are a significant, but not 
insurmountable, barrier to market participation.   
  We turn now to our estimation of model 2, in which we allow transactions costs to vary by 
primary mode of transportation and the distance to a permanent market.  Both of these variables 
are obtained from the village-level portion of the survey.  A priori, we expect that the distance 
from a permanent market will not have a major impact in villages where maize is primarily 
hauled by bicycle or animals, on the assumption that maximum feasible distance for hauling by 
these modes of transport is relatively short.  For example, we expect that there is little difference, 
say, between 15 kilometers and 20 kilometers: in both cases, the distance is too great to move 
large amounts of commodity using only human or animal power.  Conversely, where trucks are 
the major means of transportation, the effects of an increase in distance are more likely to be 
important.   
  The estimates provided in table 4 show that including the additional transactions cost 
variables has  a very minor impact on the supply and demand parameters.  More interesting, the 
results confirm our intuitive notion on how transportation infrastructure and distance should 
interact.  Transactions costs in villages with truck transport begin at a lower level than 
transaction costs in villages with bicycle/animal transport and then increase with distance.   18 
Villages with primarily bicycle or animal transport have higher transactions costs, and they do 
not change with the distance from a permanent market.  
  A sense for the quantitative importance of transactions costs can be obtained from Figure 1.  
In this figure transactions costs are graphed against the distance from a permanent market.  Once 
again, since the transactions costs are estimated as additive to the log of market price, we have 
taken their exponent to find the ad valorem make tax equivalent.  For villages with 
bicycle/animal the ad valorem equivalent of the transactions costs is estimated to be 1.23, or 23% 
of market price, and are shown by the horizontal line in the figure.  For villages that transport 
maize by truck, transactions costs range from a low of 19% of market price when a permanent 
market is one kilometer away, to a high of 58% in the village located 48 kilometers from a 
permanent market.   
  We interpret these results as measuring the effect of market integration on fixed transaction 
costs.  These costs are measured relative to the household specific market prices, which should 
include the marketing margins charged by traders.  To the extent that transportation type and 
distance proxy for the degree of market integration, the results indicate that transactions costs 
increase as villages become more isolated.  While the exact source of the cost increase has not 
been identified, there are several stylized facts that may provide some insight.  First, we would 
expect that the more isolated villages will have the highest degree of covariation between price 
and household supply.  General equilibrium linkages will cause household supply shocks to be 
correlated with market price, increasing the probability of households remaining in autarky.  
Second, we might also expect less opportunity for off-farm employment in isolated villages, 
although this is a hypothesis we have not yet verified.  Finally, search costs and the effort 
required to obtain market information may be higher in the more isolated villages.  19 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  For those locations where external conditions limit a household’s ability to market 
agricultural products or increase agricultural productivity, alternative public investments may 
well hold greater potential for poverty alleviation than additional agricultural research.  In this 
paper, we have generated what we believe to be the first quantitative measures of the fixed 
transactions costs facing semisubsistence households.  The magnitude of those transactions costs, 
estimated here to be equivalent to an ad valorem tax of 28%, indicates that public infrastructure 
investment represent a potentially fruitful avenue for improving welfare of semisubsistence 
households in Kenya. 
  Our empirical results support a generally held belief that transactions costs are a significant 
deterrent to market participation by rural agricultural households.  This, by itself, is not 
surprising, and can be inferred by simply noting a significant number of households in the survey 
neither purchase nor sell maize.  However, we have also provided some empirical estimates on 
how market integration affects the size of the price bands facing rural households.  With cross 
sectional data the more standard cointegration techniques for testing the degree of market 
integration are not available to us.  Instead, we used data on primary modes of transportation and 
the distance to the nearest permanent market as indirect measures of the degree a village is 
integrated into broader markets.   
  Our results indicate a considerable degree of heterogeneity.  Everything else the same, fixed 
transactions costs are generally higher in villages with primarily bicycle or animal transportation, 
but the distance to a permanent market has no significant effect.  In villages where maize is 
transported mainly by truck, fixed transactions costs are initially lower, but then increase with  20 
the distance to a permanent market.  Depending on transportation type and distance, we find the 
tax equivalent of fixed transactions costs range from 19% to 58% of market price.   
   Transactions costs of this magnitude have numerous implications for development and 
poverty alleviation policies.  In future research we intend to further investigate empirical 
regularities in the size of transactions costs, both across agro-ecological zones and across the 
socio-economic spectrum.  If transactions costs are higher for poor households – as is commonly 
supposed – then public investments that lower unit transactions costs equally for all households 
are likely to increase the welfare of (richer) households already participating in agricultural 
commodity and input markets by more than they will benefit poorer households, many of whom 
initially will be autarkic.  The success of infrastructure investment as a mechanism for enhancing 
the agricultural incomes of the poor therefore may well depend on the degree to which such 
investment can be targeted toward autarkic households (for whom transactions costs are highest).  
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TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS 
     Variable  N  Mean  C.V.  Min.  Max. 
Area planted to maize (ha)  324  4.2  2.83  0.1  138 
Maize production (kg)  324  4674.7  5.54  10  405,000 
Maize consumption (kg)  324  998.1  1.34  24  10,530 
Maize sales (kg)  324  3787.1  6.62  0  396,000 
Maize purchases (kg)  324  110.5  2.26  0  2,340 
Maize sale price (Ksh/kg)  324  11.5  0.48  4.5  25 
Maize purchase price (Ksh/kg)  324  15.2  4.95  5.0  50 
Farm size (ha)  324  15.6  0.98  0.3  1,200 
Age of household head (yrs)  324  44.7  0.34  17  89 
Household size  324  7.9  0.51  1  35 
Distance to nearest market (km)  30  17.5  0.86  1  64 
         
Education of household head:         
  No education  94        
  Primary school  143        
  Secondary school   74        
  Post-secondary school  13        
         
Distance to:
a         
  Nearest permanent market (km)  30  17.5  0.86  1  64 
  Nearest tarmac road (km)  30  9.6 11.1  0.0  47 
  Nearest seed dealer (km)  30  10.3 10.4 0.1  45 
 
a.  Distance data are village level. 
 
Source: Kenya Maize Impact Study  
 TABLE 2.  MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF MODEL 1
 
 
  Supply  Demand  Transactions   
Variable Equation  Equation  Cost  Equation 
Maize sale price     0.63
 ***  ––
       ––      
 (0.15) 
 
Maize purchase price  ––   –0.25 
***  ––  
     (0.11)    
 
Education 0.12    0.06    ––  
 (0.13)  (0.11)     
 
Farm size  0.45 
*** 0.23 
***  ––  
 (0.08)  (0.05)       
 
Household size  –0.07   0.34 
***  ––  
 (0.14)  (0.09) 
 
τ  ––   ––   0.25 
*** 
         (0.03) 
 
e3         0.14 
*** 
     (0.03) 
        
N  324 324 324 TABLE 3.  SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION EQUATION ESTIMATES
 
 
 Supply  Demand     
Variable Equation  Equation     
Maize sale price     0.13
       ––
         
 (0.17) 
 
Maize purchase price  ––    –0.09         
     (0.12) 
 
Education 0.16    0.12       
 (0.13)  (0.10)   
 
Farm size  0.45 
*** 0.25 
***    
  (0.06)  (0.05)     
 
Household size  –0.04   0.38 
***    
 (0.12)  (0.09) 
      
N 324  324 TABLE 4.  MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF MODEL 2
 
 
  Supply  Demand  Transactions   
Variable Equation  Equation  Cost  Equation 
Maize sale price     0.62
 ***  ––
       ––      
 (0.15) 
Maize purchase price  ––   –0.25 
***  ––  
     (0.11)    
Education 0.13    0.06    ––  
 (0.13)  (0.11)     
Farm size  0.46 
*** 0.23 
***  ––  
 (0.08)  (0.05)       
Household size  –0.07   0.34 ***  ––  
 (0.14)  (0.09) 
Truck transport dummy  ––   ––   0.25 
*** 
         (0.03) 
Bicycle/animal transport dummy  ––   ––   0.21 
*** 
        (0.05) 
Truck ×  distance  ––   ––   0.006 
***  
        (0.002) 
Bicycle/animal ×  distance  ––   ––   0.0006 
        (0.0018) 
e3  ––   ––   0.15 
*** 
     (0.03) 
N 324  324  324 
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